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Perceptions, Politics, and Peace: The Limits of Globalization in 
Legitimizing the International Criminal Court 
 
Aimee Mackie 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
In a globalizing world, the field of human rights has attempted to reach a universal moral 
consensus that transcends state sovereignty. The creation of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) in 1998 provided a new mechanism to support these efforts. Although the jurisdiction of 
the Court extends across the globe, so far all of the investigations have taken place on the 
continent of Africa. This fact, along with the details of the cases the Court has taken up, has 
sparked questions concerning neocolonialism and the political independence of the Court. In 
order for the Court to improve its reputation in the global community, it must acknowledge, 
address, and work toward remedying these genuine concerns in a just and open manner. The 
inability of the ICC to overcome accusations of neocolonialism and the continual obstacle of 
state sovereignty evidence the complex impact that globalization has had on international 
criminal law. The ICC has the potential to bring violators of international criminal law to justice, 
but in doing so it must avoid promoting impunity among the politically powerful and recognize 
that there are some situations in which arrest warrants and criminal prosecution cannot bring 
peace. 
   Organizationally, I will begin this essay with a brief history of international criminal law along 
with the role of the ICC. Next, I will describe the theoretical background framing three main 
challenges facing the Court. After explaining the theory, I will include a section of case studies, 
which show concrete manifestations of the challenges to the Court. Finally, I will discuss how 
the lessons of the theoretical framework and case studies reveal the inability of globalization to 
supersede the paradigm of a state-centered world order. In light of these lessons, I will make 
suggestions as to how globalization can be used moving forward to reform the ICC. 
   The first challenge facing the International Criminal Court is the furtherance of the paradigm 
that diminishes Africa as a continent full of victims and perpetrators who cannot function 
independently of ex-colonial powers. The second challenge I will discuss is the use of human 
rights language to depoliticize and conceal power dynamics both on the international and 
national levels. Finally, I will explain how the failure of the Court to apply its jurisdiction evenly 
increases the risk of furthering human rights abuses in the long term. 
   The case study demonstrating the first challenge will be an examination of the rhetoric 
constructing the 2010 “ICC Outreach Programme Report.” Next, in order to demonstrate the 
politics lying behind the depoliticized language of human rights, I will examine the role of the 
United States in referring cases to the ICC, as well as U.S. military interventions that coincide 
with interests of the Court. In order to address the final challenge, I will explain how national 
political alliances have negatively influenced peace processes in Uganda and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. 
   Each of these challenges jeopardizes the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Court and injures 
its chances “to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute 
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to the prevention of such crimes.”1 Achieving this aim must not be carried out in a maladaptive 
manner. The world ought not to passively accept that even with the creation of the ICC, 
perpetrators are able to evade prosecution due to their nationality or political clout. This essay is 
not meant to discount the work that is being done by the Court, but to highlight improvements 
that can be made. 
 
II.  Contemporary History of International Criminal Law 
 
To understand the need for the International Criminal Court, one must look back at the recent 
history of international criminal law. After World War II, the drafting of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights gave birth to a new era of international human rights. In the wake 
of this movement, the Allied Powers established the Tokyo and Nuremburg Tribunals to bring 
war criminals from imperial Japan and Nazi Germany to justice.
2
 After these two tribunals, the 
U.N. Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) in The Hague and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which is located in 
Arusha, Tanzania.
3
 A disadvantage to these temporary courts is that they each have to draft 
charters upon establishment and this lengthy process takes time during which the cases cannot be 
tried.
4
 
   A number of mixed tribunals that combine an international tribunal with a national court have 
also been established to prosecute crimes in East Timor, Cambodia, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone, 
as well as the special tribunal for Lebanon located in The Hague.
5
 Aside from the special tribunal 
for Lebanon, the fact that these tribunals are located in the countries in which the crimes were 
committed allows the people affected by the crimes to feel much closer to the process. 
   While the previously mentioned courts were created in response to a specific breach of 
international law and are temporary in nature, the International Criminal Court is the first 
permanently established court for trying war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and acts 
of aggression. The ICC is meant to be less partisan than the preceding courts and able to punish 
each side of a conflict. The Rome Statute, which established the Court, went into effect on July 1, 
2002, and is a treaty nations can choose to sign.
6
 However, the Court has a complementarity 
jurisdiction, which means it will only act when the state is unwilling or unable to prosecute the 
alleged perpetrators.
7
 The Court can only try crimes that occurred after the Rome Statute went 
into effect. It is also limited to crimes that occurred on the territory of a member state or by a 
member state’s nationals.8 The only exceptions are if a country accepts the jurisprudence of the 
Court regarding a specific crime or if the United Nations Security Council refers a situation that 
occurred in a United Nations member state.
9
 The ICC also cannot breach treaties between two 
states.
10
 
   In the Court’s nine years of functioning, all of the cases that have been formally investigated 
have been against people from Africa. This would be acceptable had no crimes that fell under the 
Rome Statute been committed outside of Africa. However, potential cases could include Israel’s 
bombings in Lebanon, particulars of the United States’ involvement in Iraq, Russia’s actions in 
Chechnya, and abuses in Sri Lanka.
11
 The Court has not formally investigated any of these cases. 
However, the Office of the Prosecutor has started preliminary examinations in the non-African 
nations of Afghanistan, Colombia, Georgia, Honduras, the Republic of Korea, and Palestine.
12
 
   Underdevelopment may be another factor contributing to the fact that every case has been 
located within Africa. Decades of outside intrusion have left many African nations without 
strong central governments capable of ending internal impunity. Some countries have admitted 
their inability to prosecute cases for themselves by referring internal situations to the Court. For 
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example, Uganda’s government recommended the situation in Northern Uganda to the Court in 
order to increase international efforts to disarm the Lord’s Resistance Army.13 Alternatively, the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) found an unwillingness to prosecute in Sudan, as that 
government had not taken sufficient action against perpetrators of crimes against humanity and 
genocide, and therefore recommended this case to be investigated by the Court.
14
 
   The Chief Prosecutor can also open investigations on his or her own volition within states party 
to the Rome Statute, without a recommendation from a state party or the Security Council. This 
propio motu power aims to remove the ICC from political pressure and makes it less dependent 
on state action.
15
 This power is limited by the fact that any case can also be deferred for 
unlimited one-year periods by the UNSC.
16
 The ICC also relies on state funding in order to 
function.
17
 If the Court acts in opposition to party states, then it risks not having enough funding 
to proceed. Although the Court has tried to establish safeguards against politicization, the issue 
of funding remains contentious. In light of the structural hindrances to the ICC’s ability to 
enforce its global jurisdiction or overcome international power dynamics, the article will now 
examine how rhetoric surrounding the concept of international human rights perpetuates 
neocolonialism. The term neocolonial refers to the influence of a world power over another state 
through political, economic, or cultural pressures. After the formal end of the colonial era, many 
colonial powers continue to exert their influence over former colonies through neocolonial 
methods, which challenge the sovereignty of the newly formed states. 
 
III.  Theoretical Background 
 
A.  Destructive Perceptions 
 
The ICC operates within a context of international criminal law in which there is discourse that 
tends to oversimplify complex conflicts by replicating the illusory dichotomy between the 
“innocent victim” and the “heartless criminal.” This rhetoric surrounding victims often brings to 
light neocolonial undertones.
18
 The act of discussing the inevitability of the International 
Criminal Court as a necessary step in international law sounds hauntingly like colonial discourse 
demanding “progress” for the good of conquered peoples.19 Likewise, victims are shaped as 
being helpless if not for the necessary intervention of this external mechanism for justice. 
Rhetoric surrounding perpetrators likewise reveals remnants of colonial rhetoric. Strikingly, the 
words “barbaric” and “savage” continue to be used to describe acts of rape and sexual violence 
in the context of human rights violations. These terms “otherize” and degrade perpetrators to a 
subhuman level.
20
 A search on the ICC’s website turns up fifty-five separate documents 
containing the word “barbaric”; the descriptor “savage” similarly turns up forty-seven entries. 
   The present time is not so far removed from the colonial past that these terms do not hearken 
back to rationalizations of colonialism. In the eyes of the global community such negatively 
connotative words do not legitimize human rights as a form of universal respect and 
understanding. This rhetoric instead strengthens the argument that the ICC is a form of 
neocolonialism institutionalized through international criminal law. In order to increase the 
legitimacy of international human rights norms and the ICC, the assumptions this rhetoric makes 
and the dehumanizing effect it has must be evaluated. 
  
 
 
 
 135 
B.  Disguised Politics 
 
In the human rights field, universality is a key principle. There is a general consensus that 
genocide and grave human rights violations must be prevented and punished. One danger of 
rhetoric placing too much emphasis on universality, however, is that it can conceal political 
motivations behind international interventions under the guise of promoting human rights.
21 
Often conflicts in the Global South are explained by ethnic tensions and are not given sufficient 
political or economic analysis. One example is the genocide in Darfur, which is often described 
as mainly an ethnic conflict, while ignoring the environmental and economic struggles.
22
 
   Simplifying the conflict into ethnic terms will not foster a long-term solution, but only 
produces a dichotomy of good versus evil in which one side is considered to be the victim 
needing outside assistance while the other acts out of hateful irrationality. However, this 
dichotomy does have some strategic usefulness. In cases in which good and evil are defined so 
bluntly, the ICC can deceptively appear to be fulfilling the duty of prosecuting violations of 
human rights in a non-political fashion.
23
 
   Here the question becomes one of definition and who has the power to define war crimes or 
genocide and initiate investigations by the ICC.
24
 In many cases brought before the ICC, only 
one side of a violent conflict is being prosecuted.
25
 Indictments perceived as being politically 
charged can challenge the Court and offer evidence to its opponents that it is swayed by power 
and partisanship. The Court depends upon being apolitical in order to retain its legitimacy. The 
case studies will shed light on whether it has been successful in this regard thus far.  
 
C.  Compromising Peace 
 
Along with the political motivations behind which cases are taken by the ICC, it is also 
important to review the impacts Court cases have had on the countries in which the crimes were 
committed. After a decade of existence, the Court has the opportunity to reflect upon whether the 
ways in which it has acted have begun to end impunity and prevent international crime. Issuing 
an arrest warrant for Sudanese President al-Bashir, for example, may have actually worsened the 
humanitarian situation. In reaction to the issuance of the warrant, al-Bashir expelled dozens of 
humanitarian aid groups from the Darfur region of Sudan, leaving many internally displaced 
people without resources.
26
 In this way, the arrest warrant, without a means of enforcement, had 
an initially negative impact on Darfuris. The warrant also disrupted peace talks between rebel 
groups in Darfur and the Sudanese government.
27
 Similarly, the arrest warrant forces al-Bashir to 
retain power.
28
 If the government would be handed over to an opposition leader, he could be 
turned over to the Court. This could lead al-Bashir to commit even more grave violations of 
human rights to repress opposition. Because one of the goals of the ICC is to end violations of 
human rights, a warrant without the means to arrest al-Bashir may be counterproductive.
29
 
   Another negative impact of the Court is that one-sided indictments may lead to future conflict, 
obstructions to the peace process, and further impunity. While arrest warrants have been issued 
for heads of state, there are cases in which the effects of national politics on the ICC have been 
questionable. In terms of inter-state diplomatic relations, it would also be less risky to prosecute 
a perpetrator who does not hold national power than one who does. This temptation to take the 
less risky political step of only prosecuting those with little relative power must be avoided in 
order for the Court to retain legitimacy. The following section will include specific instances in 
which these theoretical challenges have been manifested in the first decade of the Court’s 
existence.   
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IV. Case Studies 
 
A.  Rhetoric within the “ICC Outreach Programme Report” 
 
The problematique of using neocolonial language that casts the ICC as a savior for the helpless 
victims in the developing world can be found within the “ICC Outreach Programme Report.” 
The description of the Court’s interactions with affected communities through its Outreach 
Programme reveal the dynamics in the interactions between people most affected by the Court 
and representatives of the Court. As of 2010, the Outreach Programme had active units in 
Uganda, the Central African Republic, Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, along 
with units in Chad and Europe to speak about the situation in Darfur with members of the 
Sudanese Diaspora. In each country report, people ask why there have only been cases taking 
place against African nationals, revealing the popular perception that the Court can only try 
Africans.
30
 The Outreach Programme aims to cultivate a level of awareness and understanding of 
the ICC’s mandate and mode of operations, promote access to and understanding of judicial 
proceedings, and foster realistic expectations about the Court’s work. This in turn will engender 
greater local community participation in Court proceedings by addressing the concerns of those 
in affected communities and by countering misperceptions.
31
 
   In most countries, the Programme’s initiatives focused on women’s involvement, along with 
educational, legal, and media outreach. While outreach efforts to inform victims of their rights 
and engaging legal professionals are valid, some outreach techniques seem to question the 
intellectual capacity of the local participants. In Uganda, “in light of the low level of education of 
most women,” the Outreach Unit used “drama performances enacted by local drama groups that 
have been trained on the mandate and functions of the Court.”32 Of course it would be 
irresponsible of the Court to use esoteric legal jargon in trying to explain the functions of the 
Court to lay people, but one can doubt that a drama performance could capture the nuances and 
complexities of an entity like the ICC in a way that a lecture or group discussion could not. 
Evidently, Outreach has found tools of this kind to be valuable. For 2011, Outreach planned on 
creating an ICC board game along with more “theatre and songs about the ICC.”33 
   These outreach activities differ substantially from those of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia, which are categorized as “conferences, roundtables and training 
sessions.”34 When visiting a group of girl and boy scouts, the Outreach team employed the use of 
a professional lecturer, not a board game. Even in a rare instance when the Outreach Programme 
used “dramatic reenactment of rescuer narratives performed by professional actors,” it was only 
in a conference to educate youth “how to use various forms of artistic expression as a tool for 
peace-building and social action.”35 The stark contrast between the methods employed by the 
two Outreach Programmes reveals how much more the ICC could be genuinely engaging the 
affected communities in dialogue and participatory events rather than superficial instruction on 
the functions of the Court. 
   Along with methods of literally using songs and games to describe a tool that is meant to end 
impunity and bring perpetrators of grave violations of human rights to justice, the language of 
the report shows that the ICC promotes one perception of itself and labels anything else as 
misinformation or misunderstanding. The Court’s relationship to the media reveals this goal. As 
described in the report, when a journalist reports “inaccurately” on the Court, the Unit will “visit 
such a journalist in order to address the inaccuracies, explain the processes before the Court and 
clarify any confusion.”36 While the Court has an interest in making sure that the public is not 
actively misinformed, it is problematic for it to censor legitimate concerns. Certainly the people 
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that are affected by the Court should be able to give their opinion of how the process has 
influenced the situation on the ground. 
   The report fails to include specific questions or opinions, but rather lists categories of questions 
discussed and generalized statements. When the Court informed the UNSC that Chad and Kenya 
had allowed President al-Bashir to visit their countries, Outreach generalized the reaction by 
affected communities, stating that they “welcomed these decisions and expressed the hope that 
these decisions would result in actions to ensure that States comply with their obligations.”37 
While it is likely that some, and maybe even a majority, shared this opinion, it is clear that the 
Court promotes the image of itself as largely supported by affected communities. This perception 
is seen throughout the report, and there is not one mention of a specific concern that is deemed 
legitimate. While the Outreach Programme has the opportunity to investigate how the trials are 
affecting communities, they instead choose to create one-sided plays and board games to “sell” 
the Court to the people and change their “misperceptions.”38 According to the Outreach 
Programme Report, the ICC is an international force that knows what is best for the people on 
the ground. It just has to help them come to that same understanding. 
 
B.  Selective U.S. Support 
 
The influence of global politics on the ICC can be seen through the relationship between the 
Court and the United States. Under President William Clinton, the U.S. signed, but did not ratify, 
the Rome Statute. President George W. Bush later withdrew the signature.
38
 When the Rome 
Statute was first instituted the U.S. attempted to sign bilateral agreements with 187 countries, 
making them pledge that they would not surrender U.S. citizens to the Court should warrants be 
issued for their arrest. The consequence of not signing would be withdrawal of U.S. military 
aid.
39
 These measures pressured 100 countries into signing the agreements, creating relative 
immunity for U.S. citizens. This is just one example of how the United States has tried to avoid 
being under the jurisdiction of a court that might prosecute its citizens. 
   However, the U.S. has not remained uninvolved in Court functions. The participation of the 
U.S. in cases that the U.N. Security Council refers puts the Court in a complicated position. The 
United States, Russia, and China are among the permanent members of that body and thus have 
influence over who is referred, while at the same time not being parties to the Statute. In the case 
of al-Bashir, the U.S. abstained from voting (did not veto) to refer the situation in Darfur to the 
Court. Paragraph 1593 of that resolution, however, grants U.S. citizens immunity from 
prosecution regarding the situation in Sudan.
40
 The resolution included another paragraph that 
stated the U.S. will bear no costs regarding the case in Sudan, even indirectly through the U.N.
41
 
   In Spring 2011, the U.S. participated more directly by voting on the UNSC to refer the 
situation in Libya to the ICC.
42
 Actively participating in the referral process could mean that the 
Obama administration has made positive strides in further cooperation with the ICC. However, 
like the case in Sudan, the referral of the situation in Libya to the ICC also includes an article 
that grants immunity to all “nationals, current or former officials and personnel” of states not 
party to the Rome Statute other than Libyans.
43
 This shows that the United States is still not 
willing to sacrifice its sovereignty for the furtherance of international human rights. U.S. 
cooperation regarding both the cases of Libya and Sudan is complicated further by the fact that 
neither country is a party to the Rome Statute. Although it is legal for the Security Council to 
refer the cases of Sudan and Libya because they are U.N. member states, it creates a precedent 
that citizens of non-party states will be prosecuted. However, citizens of UNSC member states 
may still be protected by their state’s veto power and remain outside of the ICC’s reach. 
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   While world powers have immunity from the ICC’s jurisdiction, this has not been a possibility 
for all states. As mentioned above, after a referral by the U.N. Security Council, the ICC issued 
arrest warrants for Sudanese citizens.
44
 The particular case that has garnered the most attention 
has been that of Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir. In 2009, the Court issued a 
warrant for his arrest on five counts of crimes against humanity and two counts of war crimes. 
Additionally, in July 2010, the Court issued a second arrest warrant including three counts of 
genocide.
45
 This was the first time the ICC issued a warrant of arrest for a sitting head of state. 
   The African Union, Arab League, Organization of Islamic Conference, and the G-77 quickly 
condemned this action.
46
 Al-Bashir articulated his objections by saying that the ICC could “eat” 
the warrant.
47
 Countries, such as Kenya, Chad, and Djibouti, have shown their loyalty to al-
Bashir and noncompliance with the warrant by accepting al-Bashir into their countries and not 
arresting him, as the Rome Statue requires its parties to do.
48
 By defying the Rome Statute, these 
states have displayed their changed opinion of the Court and diminished trust in its abilities. 
Non-party states that have likewise shown their disapproval of the warrant and welcomed al-
Bashir include China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Zimbabwe.
49
 Some who 
reject the legitimacy of the warrant claim that the Global North is targeting al-Bashir because he 
rejected foreign aid.
50
 
   Should the Court be unduly influenced by world powers, this could become even more 
worrisome for people in the Global South as the role of the U.S. military becomes more 
intertwined with the ICC. In October 2011, President Obama announced he would be sending 
100 troops to Uganda to aid in arresting or killing leaders of the Lord’s Resistance Army who 
incidentally have been indicted by the ICC. Admittedly, the Ugandan government agreed to this 
cooperation and welcomed the troops.
51
 A slightly more contentious involvement of U.S. troops, 
however, took place in Libya. The U.S. participated in the U.N. mission to assist rebel troops in 
overthrowing Qaddafi’s regime in Libya, beginning in March 2011.52 In June 2011, the ICC 
issued an arrest warrant for Qaddafi as well as two other Libyan leaders.
53
 Had U.S. forces, 
operating under NATO, arrested Qaddafi, they likely would have delivered him to the Court to 
face trial. 
   While the United States has not detained anyone and brought them to the Court, increasing 
U.S. military action under circumstances of coinciding interests with the ICC does stir up 
questions regarding its relationship with the Court. The U.S. worries about breaches of 
sovereignty and protecting its own citizens, while at the same time militarily supporting 
humanitarian missions in the Global South. In both of these cases it must be noted that the 
Ugandan government and the new rebel leaders in Libya supported U.S. involvement. 
Nevertheless, this trend could cause fear in the Global South that human rights will be used as a 
guise for outside military involvement. 
   The preamble to the Rome Statute states that, “nothing in this Statute shall be taken as 
authorizing any State Party to intervene in an armed conflict or in the internal affairs of any 
State.”54 While the order to institute a No-Fly Zone in Libya came in a separate resolution from 
the referral of Libya to the ICC, these two actions cannot be taken as completely unrelated, as the 
same body approved each. If the Court wants to uphold its stance of not violating sovereignty, it 
must do so on more than a rhetorical level. 
 
C.  National Politics in Limiting ICC Effectiveness  
 
As the ICC cannot violate state sovereignty in order to make an arrest, those holding political 
power and their allies can avoid facing the Court more easily than those without national 
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political power.
55 
In the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, political alignment has 
influenced the ease with which people have been arrested. Jean-Pierre Bemba and Bosco 
Ntaganda have faced much different fates, largely due to their respective relationships with the 
president of the DRC, Joseph Kabila. Jean-Pierre Bemba, who the ICC indicted for war crimes 
committed in the Central African Republic, is Kabila’s top political opponent. The 2006 DRC 
presidential elections came down to the two men, but Kabila emerged victorious. The two remain 
political opponents as Bemba began a presidential campaign against Kabila from The Hague for 
the 2011 election.
56
 Kabila attempted to block Bemba’s campaign by proposing a 2011 electoral 
law prohibiting anyone indicted by a court of last resort from running for president.
57
 This law 
aimed to directly bar Bemba from participating in the election. As his top political opponent, 
Kabila would not have granted Bemba sanctuary within the DRC. Rather, Bemba was arrested 
during a stay in Belgium the day after the ICC issued a warrant for his arrest. 
   Quite differently, Bosco Ntaganda, a military ally of Kabila, has not been arrested since the 
Court issued a warrant in 2006. Kabila has deployed General Ntaganda to keep Hutu forces at 
bay in Eastern Congo. In fact, the president promoted him within the army even after the ICC 
issued a warrant for his arrest.
58
 A U.N. Mapping Report on the atrocities committed in the DRC 
acknowledges this promotion and the fact that Ntaganda lives a rather public life, but no 
sanctions have been imposed on Kabila for failing to comply with the arrest warrant.
59
 The 
warrant for Ntaganda’s arrest alleges that he committed the war crime of enlisting and using 
children under the age of fifteen in his armed forces.
60
 The fact that President Kabila would 
promote a military leader accused of using such methods, and can do so without international 
sanctions, does not suggest that the ICC’s rulings are taken seriously in the global community. 
   While the ICC took positive action in bringing cases against both individuals despite their 
political alliances, the fact that both warrants were not carried out shows the limited power of the 
Court. The ICC depends upon states to enforce its arrest warrants. It is often unclear to affected 
communities as to why the ICC only issues warrants of arrest for people on one side of a violent 
conflict.
61
 In sessions held by the Outreach Programme, participants nearly always questioned 
why some parties were able to avoid arrest.
62
 This concern could decrease the legitimacy of the 
Court in the eyes of those affected communities that the Court relies on to act as witnesses in the 
trials. 
   Along with harming perceptions of the Court, when only one side of a conflict is held 
responsible for the crimes it commits, that side is likely to feel persecuted and resentful of the 
side that escaped prosecution. These latent feelings of being wronged do not bode well for 
permanent conflict resolution. For example, in Sudan, rebel groups have not been targeted for 
prosecution, while the government has been. Similarly, Ugandan and Rwandan national forces 
have not been prosecuted for crimes in the DRC, while rebel groups have been targeted.
63
 The 
sides that are not prosecuted then feel empowered to act with impunity. Oftentimes, the 
prosecutor states that investigations start with the most serious crimes, but eventually whole 
situations will be investigated. The Court must follow through with these thorough investigations 
if it takes seriously its mandate to end the crimes. 
   A further concern involving the role of the ICC in Africa is its effect on peace processes. For 
example, in 2008, the Ugandan government was on the verge of making a peace agreement with 
members of the Lord’s Resistance Army, but it no longer had control over a significant point of 
negotiation: the arrest warrants issued by the ICC.
64
 The rebels wanted immunity from the Court 
in exchange for ending their operations in Northern Uganda. The Ugandan government could not 
ensure the rebels that the charges would be dropped, but in 2010 it passed legislation that offered 
to try the rebels domestically instead of at the ICC. In this case, the pre-trial chamber will have to 
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decide if the case is no longer admissible on the basis of complementarity, which states that the 
ICC will only act if national courts are unwilling or unable to do so.
65
 
   If the International Criminal Court continues on with the case, the peace process could be 
significantly challenged. The Ugandan Army has been unable to stop the Lord’s Resistance 
Army from committing war crimes and crimes against humanity or arrest those with warrants 
from the ICC. This has raised questions among affected communities as to whether or not the 
ICC has any curbing effect on ongoing crimes.
66
 Thus, even when the ICC issues arrest warrants, 
efforts to enforce them rely on the ability of the nations in which the suspects are living. In this 
case, the ICC is seen as more of a hindrance to the peace process in Uganda than an apparatus for 
ending the violence. 
   In order to address volatile situations, one alternative to the ICC would be creating more 
localized courts. In cases of such widespread violence and human rights abuses, the community 
needs to see that those who perpetrated the crimes will be held accountable in order to find 
peace. Extensive interviews of Congolese people by researchers at University of California-
Berkeley found that 85 percent of respondents would prefer trials of war crimes to take place 
within the DRC as opposed to seven percent preferring that trials take place internationally (and 
seven percent preferring no trials at all).
67
 As the ICC is a court of last resort, individual 
countries can take the lead in establishing justice. Rather than automatically deferring to the ICC 
when atrocities occur, national and regional solutions should be considered first in order to keep 
justice as close to the victims as possible. Of course, ensuring that courts are not unduly 
politicized will remain important. 
 
V.  Lessons for Globalization 
 
Globalization’s affects on every sphere—politics, economics, the environmental, and culture— 
also apply to international human rights. The possibility for international cooperation in this field 
has increased since the end of the Cold War.
68
 When the signing of the Rome Statute created the 
ICC, the world was in the midst of globalization at levels never seen before. In order to 
investigate how the previously mentioned imperfections of the ICC reveal globalization’s 
complex impact on international criminal law, I will use the following definition of 
globalization:  
 
[It is] a historical process which transforms the special organization of social 
relations and transactions, generating transcontinental or interregional networks of 
activity, interaction, and the exercise of power…globalization is about 
connections between different regions of the world—from the cultural to the 
criminal, the financial to the environmental—and the ways in which they increase 
over time
 .69
 
 
   This definition categorizes globalization as a force that increases the level of cooperative 
power and activity on the world stage. Increased international cooperation is evident in the 
creation of an international criminal court that has the potential to bring an end to impunity and 
to create a mechanism that transcends the power of the state in order to ensure that no one is left 
vulnerable to gross human rights violations. The increased predominance of international law 
indicates a shift from a world in which states are the central insurers of rights to a paradigm in 
which there are international regimes that can protect the world’s citizens from their own 
states.
70
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   However, states still retain agency. While many states have welcomed increased inter-
nationalization, at least rhetorically, individual state actions show that self-interest still impacts 
attempts at cooperation.
71
 There are still a few states, namely the permanent members of the 
U.N. Security Council, which are able to avoid prosecution by the ICC. While these states are 
not full parties to the ICC, the increased participation shown in the active referral of Libya could 
signify a change in their levels of cooperation. The limited participation shows that globalization 
has not served as a fully equalizing force that leaves state power as insignificant. 
   State sovereignty has also stood against the forces of globalization in other ways. As an 
illustration, an individual for whom the Court has issued an arrest warrant can continue to live in 
security within the bounds of his state, should he be aligned with the politically powerful. This 
would not be possible if state sovereignty should diminish altogether. While the continuing 
strength of state sovereignty stands as an obstacle for the Court, the elimination of sovereignty 
should not be seen as an entirely positive goal for globalization. States are still necessary as the 
insurers of human rights. Protecting sovereignty makes it the most possible for people to be 
involved in the democratic process of implementing rights for themselves.
72 
   Following the whims and self-interest of powerful states may be most convenient for the Court, 
but it will not foster lasting peace. Remedying the uneven vulnerability to the Court’s 
jurisdiction will only take place if powerful states put their trust in the Court and become parties 
to the statute. The power given to the UNSC also needs to be re-examined in the near future, as 
this is the main institution that guarantees impunity to powerful states. If these states want to see 
the Court functioning to put an end to grave violations of human rights, they must acknowledge 
the harm that double standards of justice have in achieving that goal. 
   Globalization has aided in the formation of a common international criminal court and 
universal agreement on crimes that must never be committed. However, it has not been powerful 
enough to remove the rhetoric of difference and “otherization,” even in this supposedly 
conscientious realm of international human rights. The language of dehumanization still persists 
throughout human rights discourse as a way of explaining crimes. Perhaps with ever more 
constant interaction among diverse populations and a deeper understanding of history, this 
rhetoric will be replaced by more appropriate discourse that can overcome the current ubiquity of 
otherization. This has yet to be the case, and even as globalization has enabled the creation of the 
ICC, it has not allowed it to move through its first ten years without stoking fears of 
neocolonialism. 
   The Court should be sensitive to the concerns it encounters and address them in a way that 
gives credit to the intellectual capacity of the people with whom it is interacting. It also must be 
more completely informed of the historical narratives that shape the context of each situation. 
This will allow the Court to avoid simplifying complex situations as “ethnic conflict” or 
misunderstanding how issuing an arrest warrant could negatively affect the situation on the 
ground. The Court must respond to concerns raised in sessions of the Outreach Programme as 
well as through media sources. The “misunderstandings” of affected communities may reflect 
failures of the Court, not lack of knowledge. 
   In order to remedy past failures, the ICC should begin to exercise its jurisdiction evenly across 
international and political borders. Trying cases that only target perpetrators on one side of a 
conflict not only leads to questions of the politicization of the Court, but also creates impunity 
for parties not tried. Granting immunity to repressive government troops would be especially 
discouraging to people who might otherwise see the Court as their only hope to punish egregious 
violations.
74
 Those most harmed by the politicization of the Court are not the accused leaders, 
but people facing continual human rights abuses without available international remedies. 
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VI.  Conclusion 
 
Although the ICC currently stands as the actor most able to prosecute gross violations of human 
rights, eventually it would be ideal if this court were not necessary at all. This could happen if 
violations stop or if each nation has the infrastructure to prosecute the cases independently. Until 
that happens, the ICC should continue to have a role in implementing international law. It has the 
potential to end impunity globally and impact the lives of millions. However, if it continues to be 
politicized and neocolonial, it will lose the legitimacy it needs in order to function. It is 
understandable that changing an institution that took such a long time to come into creation and 
required so much agreement from party states will not be easy. 
   The reform the Court most urgently needs, however, is not a rewriting of the provisions of the 
Rome Statute; it is the choice, timing, and execution of arrest warrants and summonses. With 
Fatou Bensouda taking over the role of Chief Prosecutor in 2012, these methods may improve. 
Her appointment has garnered the support of human rights activists, the African Union, and legal 
experts alike.
74
 In order to retain this endorsement, Bensouda ought to be diligent in seeking 
justice based on understanding, impartiality, and cognizance of the impact it will have on the 
lives of the affected communities. The globalization of international justice may be able to bring 
an end to impunity, but not if it is restricted by politics and partiality. 
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